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Do all sporting prizes have a significant positive impact on attendance in a European 
national football league? Competitive intensity in the French Ligue 1 
 
Abstract 
 
Research question: This article investigates the determinants of attendance at French 
football Ligue 1 matches over the 2008-2011 period, with a focus on the effect of competitive 
intensity. This is measured by dummies that are functions of the point difference for the home 
team in relation to the different sporting prizes: title, qualification in UEFA (Union of 
European Football Associations) club competitions, relegation. The objective is to answer the 
following question: do all sporting prizes have a significant positive impact on attendance? 
Research methods: We specified and estimated a standard attendance equation including 35 
explanatory variables of which 9 are related to sporting prizes. The estimations are based on a 
Tobit model with individual cut-off points to allow for truncation of attendance at the upper 
bound given by stadia capacity (i.e. sold-out games). 1135 observations are included. 
Results and findings: Our results show that all sporting prizes have a significant positive 
impact on attendance. In particular, there is a significant impact of prizes for potential 
qualification in the UEFA Europa League which are dependent on the outcome of domestic 
cups (known only in the last part of season). 
Implications: This research contributes to the optimisation of competition format and 
knowledge on competitive intensity and determinants of attendance. It provides an argument 
in favour of current sporting prizes for managers in the main European national football 
leagues. 
 
Keywords: competitive intensity, sporting prizes, attendance, European football, French 
Ligue 1. 
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Introduction 
 
In sports economics, uncertainty of outcome has been considered as a key success factor for 
professional team sports leagues ever since the seminal articles by Rottenberg (1956), Neale 
(1964) and Sloane (1969, 1971). It is generally associated with competitive balance in the 
literature (Andreff & Scelles, 2014; Fort & Maxcy, 2003; Fort & Quirk, 1995; Groot, 2008; 
Humphreys, 2002; Késenne, 2000; Maxcy & Mondello, 2006; Szymanski, 2003; Vrooman, 
1995, 2013). According to this, a balanced contest between teams is required to generate 
uncertainty of outcome which attracts fans and thus creates public demand, which is 
measured through stadium attendance and TV audience. Nevertheless, the concept of 
competitive balance suffers from the weakness of not incorporating sporting prizes (winning 
the title, qualification in continental competitions or playoffs, promotion, relegation) that 
allow possible measures of incentives for teams and fans (Kringstad, 2005; Andreff, 2009). 
As Sloane (2006) argues, competitive balance between two teams becomes unimportant if 
there is no chance of a sporting success - no sporting prizes to be competed for. 
In European national football leagues, the different sporting prizes and the competitive 
balance should be analysed bearing in mind the necessity to have teams competing for 
success in continental competitions. To achieve this, a national league should have strong 
teams with a better level than the others in the domestic championship and thus avoid a too 
balanced competition (Andreff, 2014; Andreff & Bourg, 2006; Jardin, 2009; Scelles, 
Desbordes & Durand, 2011a). More precisely, European national football leagues seem to 
require local rather than global competitive balance: competition among teams in contention 
for the title and qualification into the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) 
Champions League; among teams in contention for qualification into the UEFA Europa 
League and among teams in contention for relegation. In other words, we need a concept that 
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includes both local competitive balance or uncertainty of outcome and sporting prizes. 
Kringstad and Gerrard (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) propose such a concept through 
competitive intensity. 
The aim of this article is to investigate the determinants of attendance at French football 
Ligue 1 matches over the 2008-2011 period with a focus on examining the effect of 
competitive intensity before a match. The model is inspired by Scelles, Durand, Bonnal, 
Goyeau and Andreff (2013a, 2013b). In this article, competitive intensity is measured by 
dummies that are functions of the difference in points for the home team in relation to 
different sporting prizes. We want to answer the following question: do all sporting prizes 
have a significant positive impact on attendance? If so, it will justify current sporting prizes 
in most European national football leagues. In particular, an objective is to know the impact 
of prizes for potential qualification in the Europa League which are dependent on the 
outcome of domestic cups (known only in the last part of season). Does the uncertainty on the 
definite consequence of such prizes reduce their interest for fans? 
The article is structured as follows. First, we review the literature about competitive 
intensity, sporting prizes and attendance at European national football leagues. Second, we 
present the organisational structure of European football club competitions and, in particular, 
the French Ligue 1. Third, we outline the model specification for Ligue 1 attendance. Fourth, 
empirical results obtained for the 2008-2011 period (1135 observations1) are reported. Fifth, 
they are discussed with regard to their implications on the organisational structure in 
European football. Sixth, limitations and future directions are drawn. 
 
Literature review 
 
                                                 
1 There are 380 matches during each season. 5 matches are excluded from the analysis because they have been 
played in camera or in another stadium than the usual one. 
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The concept of competitive intensity 
 
Kringstad and Gerrard (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) propose competitive intensity as a concept 
integrating both outcome uncertainty and sporting prizes. According to them, as well as the 
degree of equality between team playing strengths, audiences are also interested in the prizes 
(sporting successes) that may be distributed in the league (Kringstad & Gerrard, 2007b). 
Consequently, competitive intensity relates to different sporting prizes: qualification for 
European competitions, relegation to lower divisions in European leagues or playoff 
selections in both North American and European leagues. Scelles et al. (2011a) use a measure 
of intra-championship competitive intensity – by contrast with intra-match competitive 
intensity (Scelles, Durand, Bah & Rioult, 2011b) – which is an extended approach in 
comparison to Kringstad and Gerrard’s (2004) as it also includes the addition of changes in 
the league position. These changes and uncertainty of outcome correspond to the “League 
Standing Effect” (Andreff & Scelles, 2014; Neale, 1964). Intra-championship competitive 
intensity measures both uncertainty of outcome linked to sporting prizes (what is the 
percentage of teams in a situation of uncertainty considering the league table?) and changes 
in the league table related to sporting prizes. The inclusion of sporting prizes constitutes an 
extension to the “League Standing Effect” expressed by Neale (1964). 
 
Competitive intensity and attendance 
 
Neither Kringstad and Gerrard (2004, 2005, 2007) nor Scelles et al. (2011a) test the impact of 
intra-championship competitive intensity (called competitive intensity after this) and thus 
sporting prizes on attendance. Andreff (2009) notes that research in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
opened the way in showing a significant impact of sporting prizes on attendance: Jennett 
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(1984); Borland (1987); Cairns (1987); Dobson and Goddard (1992); Baimbridge, Cameron 
and Dawson (1996). None of these studies incorporate the point difference for the home team 
in comparison with its closest competitor with a different sporting prize, or the number of 
matches needed for a change of sporting prize, or a consideration of the sporting prizes at the 
bottom of the league as well as the top. Andreff (2009) notes that this research direction 
ceased because of its complexity. Scelles et al. (2013a) restart the debate through the concept 
of competitive intensity applied to the French Ligue 1. They find a significantly positive 
impact for competitive intensity measured by the point difference for the home team in 
comparison with its closest competitor with a different sporting prize. 
Following this first contribution, Scelles et al. (2013b) have been interested in 
competitive intensity measured by dummies that are function of the point difference for the 
home team in relation to sporting prizes. The authors choose eight match temporal horizons: 
if the point difference makes a change in the sporting prize in the league possible as a result 
of the following match, the following two matches… until the following eight matches. In 
addition, they highlight the fact that in the Ligue 1, the fifth and sixth positions in the league 
can potentially qualify for the Europa League and are positions that guarantee qualifying or 
not qualifying dependent on the results of the two French cups, for which the outcomes are 
only known in the last part of the season (we develop this in the next section). According to 
the authors, competitive intensity can be measured with only definite sporting prizes in the 
league but also both definite and potential sporting prizes. Their results show that competitive 
intensity has a significantly positive impact at least at the 5% level only from the horizon of 
the three next matches with only definite sporting prizes but for all the horizons with both 
definite and potential sporting prizes. 
Scelles et al. (2013b) test again their model but instead of considering dummies for an 
entire horizon of matches (the following three matches for example), they include dummies 
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measuring uncertainty of outcome only at the end of the horizon (only after the third match in 
our example). With these new dummies, only the first three are significant at the 1% level 
with only definite sporting prizes and only the first two with definite and potential sporting 
prizes for which the authors note that the results are more consistent. Indeed, the horizon of 
four matches is less significant than that of five matches with only definite sporting prizes, 
whereas this is the opposite with definite and potential sporting prizes, which is more logical. 
Scelles et al. (2013b) conclude that such results could indicate that spectators are interested in 
both definite and potential sporting prizes. 
 
The importance of the different sporting prizes 
 
A criticism of Scelles et al. (2011a) and Scelles et al. (2013a, 2013b) is the absence of 
distinction between the different sporting prizes. For these authors, the important point is that 
all teams have a sporting prize to compete for no matter what it is. There will be an 
assumption that the sporting prizes at the top of the standing are more attractive than the 
‘prize’ of avoiding relegation. In line with this, Kringstad and Gerrard (2005) propose 
weightings for the European national football championships with 1 for the title, 1/1.5² for 
direct entry to the Champions League, 1/1.75² for entry to the Champions League qualifying 
rounds, 1/2² for entry to the UEFA Cup (now Europa League) and 1/3² for relegation. 
However, they do not test that each prize has a significant positive impact on attendance. 
Pawlowski (2013) also distinguishes between different sporting prizes in German 
professional football: fight for the title, fight for qualification into the Champions League, 
fight for qualification into the Europa League and the fight against relegation. His objective 
was to measure what he calls the perceived competitive balance of fans through a written 
survey administered to German football fans. In particular, he asked them if they consider 
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that the fight for every sporting prize mentioned above remains exciting late into the season. 
Pawlowski (2013) finds that the respondents perceive the fight for the Champions League 
and Europa League and the fight against relegation as being very exciting and suspenseful. 
Nevertheless, he does not test their impact on attendance. This is the aim of our article. 
 
Structure of European football club competitions and the French Ligue 1 
 
Structure of European football club competitions 
 
European football leagues operate on a merit-based pyramidal structure. Within any one 
country, the best performing teams are promoted from a given national league division to its 
immediately senior division on the basis of league ranking at the end of each season, with the 
poorest performing teams relegated to the immediately junior division on the same grounds 
(Szymanski, 2003). In the top division, the performance incentive is to achieve one of the 
highest ranking positions which offer qualification into Europe-wide continental competitions 
(the Champions and Europa Leagues). The number of places in continental competitions for a 
country depends on its UEFA country coefficient, which in turn is determined by the results 
of the clubs within a particular national association in the continental competition games over 
the previous five seasons. The UEFA ranking determines the number of teams competing in 
the season after the next one, not in the immediate season after the publication of the ranking. 
Thus, the rankings at the end of the 2013-2014 season determine the team allocation by 
association in the 2015-2016 UEFA season. However, the actual teams that will be 
participating are determined at the end of the 2014-2015 season when the individual 
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association classifications and national cups are finalised2. Table 1 sets out the impact of the 
UEFA country ranking on the number of places in continental club competitions. 
 
Table 1 
 
For a national league organiser, the objective is to have successful teams in continental 
competitions as it improves the league prestige and increases its UEFA country ranking. As a 
result, there are more domestic teams in continental competitions, meaning more chances to 
be successful (virtuous circle). Besides, more places in continental competitions provides 
more incentives for teams to reach a top ranking and a priori more incentives for fans to 
attend games. One place is allocated to the domestic cup winner. If the latter has already 
qualified for a continental competition through its placing in the league championship, its 
place as domestic cup winner was allocated to the domestic cup runner-up until 2013-2014 
(to the team not already qualified in a continental competition with the best ranking in the 
championship from 2014-2015). If the domestic cup runner-up had also already qualified for 
a continental competition through the championship, the place in respect of the domestic cup 
was allocated to the team with the best ranking in the league championship not already 
qualified for a continental competition. As the domestic cup final ordinarily takes place at the 
end of a season, inevitably there is uncertainty around the consequences of attaining one 
position in the national league (i.e. qualifying or not for the Europa League) during the 
season itself. In the English Premier League and the French Ligue 1, there is a second place 
not allocated through the championship as it is intended to the league cup winner. 
 
Structure of the French Ligue 1 
                                                 
2 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_coefficient. Accessed January 2015. 
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The French football Ligue 1 is recognized as one of the six major European leagues, along 
with the English Premier League, German Bundesliga 1, Italian Serie A, Portuguese Primeira 
Liga and Spanish Liga 1 (see Table 1). It is a championship organized by the French 
professional football league (Ligue de Football Professionnel, LFP). The competition 
involves 20 teams and starts in late July or early August to conclude in middle or late May. 
Each team plays every other team, both home and away, so that there are 38 game weeks. For 
each match, a success provides 3 points, a draw 1 point and a defeat 0 point. At the end of 
season, the first ranked team is the champion whereas the three last teams are relegated. In 
the Ligue 1, as for the other European national leagues, the qualification of a team into 
European competitions depends on its final position in the league: 
- the first two qualify for the next Champions League without participating in the 
preliminary round; 
- the third qualifies for the Champions League preliminary round with the risk of being 
eliminated in this round and placed into the Europa League; 
- the fourth qualifies for the Europa League. 
The fifth and the sixth can also qualify for the Europa League dependent on the results 
of the two French cups: “La Coupe de France” and “La Coupe de la Ligue”. “La Coupe de la 
Ligue” is a contest between professional clubs only whereas “La Coupe de France” involves 
both professional and amateur clubs. The winners qualify for the UEFA Europa League (or 
the Coupe de France runner-up if the winner had already qualified for European competitions 
as a consequence of its position in the Ligue 1 until 2013-2014). If a winning club is part of 
the four first positions in the Ligue 1, the fifth qualifies for the Europa League; if the two 
French cup winner(s) is(are) part of the four first positions in the Ligue 1, then both the fifth 
and the sixth qualify for the Europa League. Consequently, the fifth and sixth ranks are 
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potentially qualifying ranks (rather than definite qualifying ranks) and become definitely 
qualifying or not qualifying ranks according to progress in the two French cups, for which the 
outcomes are only known in the last part of the season. 
 
Model specification 
 
We specify and estimate a fairly standard demand equation that makes distinctions among the 
explanatory factors that have an effect on attendance, the following groups of variables: 
socioeconomic variables, variables proxying the expected quality of the match, those 
capturing incentives for attending a match, the “season effect” (since there are three seasons) 
and variables measuring competitive balance and intensity. 
The endogenous variable is the log-attendance for a match. Among the socioeconomic 
variables we include four indicators for the home team: the log-urban area population, the 
departmental percentage of young people (less than 25 years old), the log-arrondissement per 
capita income by hour and the departmental unemployment rate for the current month. The 
urban area population is comparable with the American Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area. Nevertheless, data about other socioeconomic variables is not available for the French 
urban areas. Our idea is to select values which correspond to the territorial scales that are not 
too different from urban areas. France is organized in different territorial scales, from the 
larger to the smaller: régions, départements, arrondissements and villes (cities). The level 
that best equates with an urban area is the arrondissement but data is available only for 
income on that scale, which is why we have selected departmental values for young people 
and unemployment. We expect to see the positive effects of population, percentage of young 
people and unemployment, and a negative effect of income. Indeed, previous studies about 
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football find it is an inferior good (Bird, 1982; Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson, 1996; 
Falter and Pérignon, 2000; Scelles et al., 2013a, 2013b). 
The expected quality of the match can first be measured by what Garcìa and Rodrìguez 
(2002) call ex ante quality, that is the quality of both teams at the beginning of the season, 
independent of performance previous to the match, and secondly by those variables proxying 
the most recent performance of both teams (current quality). In the first group, we take into 
account the log-budgets for both teams. Garcìa and Rodrìguez (2002, p. 20) note that “they 
depend, among other things, on the salaries of the players, which should proxy their 
productivity”. Among the variables considered when capturing the recent performance of 
both teams we include the standings for both teams and the average number of goals scored at 
home by the home team before the match (for the first match of the season at home, we rely 
on the average number of goals during the last season). We expect all variables of increasing 
quality to have a positive effect on attendance, that is to say a negative sign for standings 
because the best rank is 1 and the worst is 20. 
We include the game week and its square and a set of dummies so as to capture 
incentives for attending a football match. We incorporate television dummies, a geographical 
derby dummy, hooliganism dummy, a substitute dummy, a “waiting for a new stadium” 
dummy and a “promotion effect” dummy. A typical game week took place as follows over 
the 2008-2011 period: six matches at 7 pm on Saturday, one match at 9 pm on Saturday, two 
matches at 5 pm on Sunday and one match at 9 pm on Sunday. This latter is the major match 
of the game week and is broadcast on the paid subscription channel Canal +. This channel 
could be subscribed to alone or as part of a set of channels called Canal Sat that made the six 
matches at 7 pm on Saturday and the two matches at 5 pm on Sunday accessible. The match 
at 9 pm on Saturday was broadcast on Orange Sport which required a separate subscription. 
Matches were occasionally played during the week. 
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The substitute dummy incorporates possibilities that there is (a) rugby club(s) which 
play(s) in the first division in the urban area. In the French context, football is the most 
popular sport and generates much more income than the other sports. Nevertheless, rugby – 
which has known a strong economic development since 1995 and its professionalization – 
seems likely to become competition for football. The only cities with both clubs in the first 
division of football and rugby are Paris (one rugby club in 2008-2009, two in 2009-2010 and 
2010-2011), Montpellier and Toulouse. 
The hooliganism dummy involves one team in a single season: Paris-Saint-Germain 
(PSG) in 2010-2011. PSG had problems between two supporters associations which 
corresponded to the two stands in its stadium (Parc des Princes): Auteuil and Boulogne. In 
the 2010-2011 season, PSG ex-President Robin Leproux decided to stop subscriptions for 
Auteuil and Boulogne and established a random distribution of tickets in these stands. This 
decision, which was necessary to improve the atmosphere in the stadium, is expected to have 
a negative effect on attendance during the 2010-2011 season. 
The “waiting for a new stadium” dummy is based on the future construction of seven 
new enclosures in Bordeaux (Girondins de Bordeaux, GB), Le Havre (Havre Athletic Club, 
HAC), Le Mans (Mans Football Club, MFC), Lille (Lille Olympique Sporting Club, LOSC), 
Lyon (Olympique Lyonnais, OL), Nice (Olympique Gymnaste Club Nice, OGCN) and 
Valenciennes FC (VAFC) (see Table 2). The new stadia will improve public comfort and the 
new capacity will be more consistent with potential local attendance.  
 
Table 2 
 
The “promotion effect” dummy concerns teams which played in Ligue 2 (French 
football second division) during the previous season. 
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We incorporate the “season effect” to distinguish whether matches were played in 
2008-2009, 2009-2010 or 2010-2011. 
Competitive balance is measured with betting odds through the Theil (1967) measure: 
THEIL = ∑ [pi * log(∑pi / pi)] / ∑pi, 
where pi reports the home team’s winning probability, the away team’s winning probability 
as well as the draw probability of a certain match. The index is increasing with increasing (a 
priori) uncertainty of match outcome (Pawlowski & Anders, 2012). 
Competitive intensity is measured by dummies that are functions of the point difference 
for the home team in relation to sporting prizes and the nature of these. The different sporting 
prizes are the following: 
1) winning the league (first position); 
2) direct entry to the Champions League (second position); 
3) entry to the Champions League qualifying round (third position); 
4) direct entry to the Europa League (fourth position and fifth position if the finalists of the 
French Cup belong to the four first ranks); 
5) entry to the Europa League qualifying round (fifth position if the winner of the League 
Cup is in the four first positions, but not the winner or the finalist of the French Cup; or 
sixth position if both the finalists of the French Cup and the winner of the League Cup 
hold the five first positions); 
6) potential direct entry to the Europa League (fifth position as long as we do not know if 
two teams among the four first position will participate in the French Cup final); 
7) potential entry to the Europa League qualifying round (sixth position as long as we do not 
know if two teams among the five position ranks will participate in the French Cup final 
and one team among the five first positions will win the League Cup); 
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8) double prize (if the home team is concerned by sporting prizes both at the top and the 
bottom of the standing);  
9) relegation (three last positions, i.e. eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth). 
It is important to specify that if a team is in contention for several sporting prizes 
among the first seven (“top prizes”), only the prize associated to the best ranking is taken into 
account (1 for this prize, 0 for the other prizes). We have to choose a temporal horizon to 
calculate our dummies, that is to say we have to determine what maximum point difference 
and thus what maximum number of matches are relevant to consider competitive intensity. 
Scelles et al. (2013b) suggest that the next match and the next two matches could be the most 
appropriate temporal horizons in explaining attendance but also find a significant positive 
impact for the next three and four matches. We rely on the first three horizons and control 
whether the fourth is too large to maintain public interest by adding two variables in the 
model for the next three matches: top prizes and relegation for the next fourth match. 
So as to limit the number of observations with “double prize” which is difficult to 
interpret, we apply the following rule for the second and third horizon: if 1 match (2 matches) 
is sufficient for a top (bottom) prize whereas 2 matches (3 matches) are required for a bottom 
(top) prize, the prize is considered as a top (bottom) prize. For instance, for the second 
horizon, if a team is 2 points behind the sixth and 4 points ahead of the eighteenth, it is 
considered in contention for sixth position.  
The basic data set comes from the French football league (LFP). The descriptive 
statistics and the sources of the variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
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To allow for truncation of attendance at the upper boundary given by stadia capacity 
(i.e. sold-out games), we implement a Tobit model with individual cut-off points as in 
Burdekin and Idson (1991). Since the actual stadia capacity may vary from game to game due 
to safety measures etc., we set a capacity limit of 95% by further controlling for robustness at 
90% as suggested by Forrest, Simmons and Szymanski (2004) as well as at 98% of capacity 
utilization as suggested by Pawlowski and Nalbantis (2015). The estimated standard errors 
are robust to heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
 
Results 
 
We estimated several versions of our equation using 1135 observations corresponding to the 
1135 matches that took place in the French football Ligue 1 during the 2008-2011 period and 
can be integrated in our data (see footnote 1). We want to answer the following question: do 
all sporting prizes have a significant positive impact on attendance? When using a limit of 
95% of capacity utilisation, attendance figures for 49 matches are right censored. We test the 
robustness of the results by employing a 90% and a 98% of capacity utilization limit as 
indicated before (respectively 171 and 18 right censored matches). Table 4 reports the results 
of the Tobit regression models using a limit of 95% of capacity utilization. When significance 
is different with 90% or 98% of capacity utilization limit, a note is added at the end of the 
table. The results for the different sporting prizes (other than relegation) are those without 
incorporation of the home team standing which captures an important part of their impact3. 
Our comments focus only on the different sporting prizes. For the other explanatory 
variables, results are globally consistent with our expectations and with Scelles et al. (2013a, 
2013b). 
                                                 
3 Their results with the home team standing are available upon request. 
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Table 4 
 
Winning the title (prize 1), direct entry to the Champions League (prize 2), potential 
entry to the Europa League qualifying round (prize 7), double prize (prize 8) and relegation 
(prize 9) have a significant positive impact with the three horizons. It is also the case for entry 
to the Europa League qualifying round (prize 5) with the limit of 90% of capacity utilisation 
(not significant for the next match with the limits of 95% and 98%). Entry to the Champions 
League qualifying round (prize 3) and direct entry to the Europa League (prize 4) have a 
significant positive impact for the next two matches and the next three matches, but only with 
the limit of 90% of capacity utilisation for the next two matches for direct entry to the Europa 
League. Potential entry to the Europa League (prize 6) is not significant for the three 
horizons, except for the two next matches with the limit of 90% of capacity utilisation. In the 
model for the next three matches, relegation for the next fourth match has a significant 
positive impact only at the 10% level and top prizes for the next fourth match are not 
significant. This is partially consistent with the hypothesis that the horizon of the next fourth 
match is too large to maintain public interest. Summing up, all sporting prizes (except top 
prizes for the next fourth match) have a significant positive impact for at least one horizon 
with at least one limit of capacity utilisation. 
An additional test consists of identifying whether sporting prizes have a significant 
positive impact for the next match, the next second match (instead of the next two matches, 
meaning that the next match is excluded so as to consider a possibility of change only at the 
end of the second match) and the next third match (instead of the next three matches). The 
problem with such a test is that we have to decide whether it is the importance or the 
closeness of the sporting prize that we have to promote. For instance, if a team can reach the 
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first position at the end of the next third match and the second position at the end of the next 
match, should we put a dummy equal to 1 for winning the title for the next third match 
(importance) or direct entry to the Champions League for the next match (closeness)? We test 
again our model by distinguishing the two cases: 1) the main sporting prize is promoted 
(importance); 2) the closest sporting prize is promoted (closeness). Table 5 reports our 
results4. 
 
Table 5 
 
For the next match, all 9 sporting prizes have a significant positive impact in at least 
one of the two tests. For the next second match, this is the case for 8 sporting prizes with 
potential entry to the Europa League qualifying round (prize 7) being the only exception (not 
significant). For the next third match, this is the case for 6 sporting prizes, the exceptions 
being Europa League qualifying round (prize 5) and potential entry to the Europa League 
qualifying round (prize 7) which are not significant, and potential entry to the Europa League 
(prize 6) which has a significant negative impact (but only three matches are concerned); 
double prize (prize 8) has a significant positive impact only at the 10% level and with a limit 
of 90% of capacity utilisation in both tests. 
For the next match, 8 out of 9 sporting prizes have a significant positive impact in both 
tests, potential Europa League (prize 6) being the only exception (not significant for 
importance). For the next second match, this is the case for 7 sporting prizes with Champions 
League qualifying round (prize 3) the only exception (not significant for closeness) among 
the 8 sporting prizes significant in at least one of the two tests. For the next third match, this 
is the case for only 3 sporting prizes among the 6 sporting prizes significant in at least one of 
                                                 
4 We only report the results for the different sporting prizes. Those for the other explanatory variables are 
unchanged and available upon request. 
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the two tests. Indeed, winning the title (prize 1) and Champions League qualifying round 
(prize 3) are not significant for closeness and potential Europa League (prize 6) is not 
significant for importance). Summing up, all sporting prizes have a significant positive 
impact with both tests for at least one horizon. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our results are consistent with Scelles et al. (2013a) who find a significant positive impact of 
sporting prizes without distinguishing the different sporting prizes and Scelles et al. (2013b) 
who suggest that the next match and the next two matches could be the best temporal 
horizons to consider competitive intensity. Our research extends knowledge about the latter 
by showing that all sporting prizes are significant in a European national football league. This 
is consistent with the assumption expressed in Introduction which set out that European 
national football leagues require local rather than global competitive balance considering the 
need for strong teams that are better than the others so as to be competitive in European 
competitions. 
Our results indicate that being in contention for a potential qualification in the Europa 
League or its qualifying round has a significant positive impact for at least one horizon. In 
other words, the uncertainty concerning the definite consequence of the fifth and sixth 
positions during the major part of the season does not prevent these positions from being 
attractive for fans. It gives an argument for LFP managers who organize both the Ligue 1 and 
“La Coupe de la Ligue” to keep this stance, although many French football stakeholders are 
not convinced that it is useful because it can remove a qualifying position for the Europa 
League. This is consistent with Scelles et al. (2013b) for whom taking into account potential 
sporting prizes in addition to definite ones when considering competitive intensity is relevant 
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as it leads to more logical results. Not only does “La Coupe de la Ligue” not have a negative 
impact on competitive intensity in the Ligue 1, but also it can “save the season” for a club 
which has no possibility of sporting success in other competitions. Generalisation of this 
aspect is limited in Europe as only England also allocates a place in the Europa League 
through its League Cup. 
The significant positive impact of relegation on attendance is useful as it makes the 
argument in favour of keeping opened leagues rather than changing to closed or nearly-closed 
leagues in European professional football and more generally European professional team 
sports. In the specific framework of French major leagues (football, rugby and basketball), 
some managers highlight the weaknesses of opened leagues (Scelles, 2009, 2010). At 
microeconomic level, relegation and also the possibility of relegation are considered as 
economically bad for a club: relegation means less revenue and significantly less use of the 
stadium with possible dramatic consequences for clubs (examples of Le Mans, Grenoble and 
Strasbourg in France in the past years); the possibility of relegation is frightening for 
investors, sponsors and new stadium projects. At mesoeconomic level, opened leagues do not 
guarantee teams with the best economic potential in the championship. These problems, 
identified for French leagues, are applicable for the other European national leagues. Some 
authors suggest creating closed or nearly-closed European Superleague for the best teams 
(Hoehn & Szymanski, 1999; Szymanski, 2007; Vrooman, 2007). The fact that relegation, but 
also sporting prizes related to qualification (or possibility of qualification) in the continental 
competitions, have a significant positive impact on attendance provides an argument in 
favour of open national leagues with all domestic teams and sporting prizes related to 
qualification in the continental competitions rather than say a closed European Super League. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
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Optimising competition format 
 
Our research shows that all sporting prizes have a significant positive impact on attendance 
for at least one horizon. Nevertheless, 115 matches out of 1135 were without sporting prize 
with the horizon of the next three matches (77 matches with the horizon of the next four 
matches). This means that the Ligue 1 format could be improved, for example by the addition 
of sporting prizes which could be a qualification to relegation play-offs like in Russia (in fact, 
this will appear in the French Ligue 1 from 2016-2017 for the 18th position) and an additional 
place in continental competitions. However, at this juncture the Ligue 1 is closer to losing a 
place rather than gaining an addition qualification place (see Table 1). An alternative 
approach would be to reduce the Ligue 1 to 18 clubs in order to make those in the middle of 
the championship closer to sporting prizes at the same time diminishing the number of 
matches, considered by some actors as a factor decreasing French clubs’ performance in 
continental competitions (Thiriez, 2013). Such a plan has been proposed by former LFP 
President Frédéric Thiriez (who has resigned on the 15th of April 2016; Get French Football 
News, 2016) and the French Minister of Sports Patrick Kanner but most of clubs are against 
this evolution and would prefer the disappearance of “La Coupe de la Ligue” (Foot01, 2014). 
A third solution would be to implement playoffs at the end of season. For example, the first 
eight teams could take part, meaning that the first eight positions would represent a sporting 
prize instead of the first six. The Belgian and Dutch leagues have established such playoffs. It 
would be interesting to measure whether competitive intensity for a qualification into the 
playoffs has a significant positive impact on attendance as current sporting prizes related to 
qualification in continental competitions. 
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Taking into account fans’ expectations 
 
Our results do not allow us to establish a clear overall hierarchy among the different sporting 
prizes from the perspective of what is most attractive for fans. Besides, when considering the 
horizon of the next second match, it can seem surprising that entry to the Europa League 
qualifying round (0.191±0.032 or 0.170±0.041) is more attractive than direct entry to the 
Europa League (0.085 or 0.086±0.041). How can we explain this unexpected result? Our 
proposition is that the attractiveness of sporting prizes for fans does not only depend on their 
absolute importance but also the anticipated position of the home team. Thus, if fans expect 
their club can be champion but it is only in contention for qualification in the Europa League, 
some of them will not attend matches. By contrast, if fans expect their club is not going to 
win or qualify for European competitions and it has the potential to reach the Europa League 
qualifying round, they will be more likely to attend matches. An avenue for future research 
could be to distinguish the determinants of attendance according to the club’s budget 
(predictor for expected sports performances) and their stability in the first division over the 
period studied (no presence in the second division). 
 
Extending the understanding of fan support 
 
In our data, we do not distinguish whether the home team looks at keeping its position or 
reaching a better one. Now, this could impact attendance. In our results, the comparison 
between double prize and relegation for the next third match retains our attention. Indeed, 
double prize (including relegation) has a significant positive impact only at the 10% level and 
with a limit of 90% of capacity utilisation, whereas relegation has a significant positive 
impact. It could mean that fans are more likely to attend when their team is in a greater 
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difficulty and needs more support. This is consistent with the fact that relegation has a 
significant positive impact whereas top prize is insignificant for the horizon of the next fourth 
match. When testing again our last models (Table 5) by distinguishing whether a team has to 
keep or change its position for relegation with the next third match and the next fourth match, 
we find that only the next third match is significant for keeping its position whereas both the 
next third match and the next fourth match are significant for changing its position, consistent 
with the aforementioned interpretation5. Future research could extend the understanding of 
fan support according to their team position. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Influence of the UEFA country ranking on the number of places in continental club competitions. 
Ranking 
2015-2016 
as of 14 
April 2016 
Member 
association 
Champions 
League places 
Europa 
League places 
Total places 
Number of 
clubs 
% places 
1 Spain 
4 3 7 
20 35 
2 Germany 18 39 
3 England 20 35 
4 Italy 
3 3 6 
20 30 
5 Portugal 18 33 
6 France 20 30 
7 
8-15 
Russia 
 
2 3 5 
16 
 
25 
 
16-31  1 3 4   
32 Liechtenstein 0 1 1   
33-51  1 3 4   
52 Gibraltar 1 1 2 10 20 
53 Andorra 
1 2 3 
8 37.5 
54 San Marino 15 20 
Source: Wikipedia (UEFA coefficient) 
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Table 2. Urban area population, initial and new capacities, percentage of rise and year of inauguration of seven 
French stadia. 
Club Population Initial capacity New capacity 
Percentage of 
rise 
Year of 
inauguration 
Bordeaux 1 009 316 34 500 42 000 21.7 % 2015 
Le Havre 288 496 16 500 25 000 51.5 % 2012 
Le Mans 304 937 16 500 25 000 51.5 % 2011 
Lille 1 163 9391 18 000 50 000 277.8 % 2012 
Lyon 1 757 183 41 000 61 500 50 % 2016 
Nice 999 682 18 500 35 000 89.2 % 2013 
Valenciennes 399 144 16 500 25 000 51.5 % 2011 
1 French part of Lille urban area but the city is close to the Belgian border and LOSC attracts Belgian spectators. 
The population to take into account would be rather around 1 800 000 inhabitants. 
Sources: LFP, SPLAF and Wikipedia 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and sources. 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Source 
Attendance 20,290 11,402 LFP (http://www.ligue1.com/) 
Population 1,184,588 2,473,448 SPLAF (http://splaf.free.fr/) 
Per capita income by hour 
(in €) 
12.75 1.343 
INSEE (http://insee.fr/en/) 
Unemployment rate 0.064 0.011 Governmental Web Site 
(http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/) 
Young people (-25) rate 0.311 0.028 INSEE 
Budget home team (M€) 51.92 34.72 
France Football magazine 
Budget away team (M€) 51.77 34.52 
Standing home team 10.73 5.692 
LFP 
Standing away team 10.32 5.667 
Goals home team at home 1.332 0.539 
Game week 19.61 10.97 
(Game week)² 504.9 441.7 
Game on weekdays 0.095 0.293 
Game on Saturday 7pm 0.539 0.499 
Game on Saturday 9pm 0.078 0.267 
Game on Sunday 5pm 0.195 0.396 
Game on Sunday 9pm 0.093 0.291 
Derby 0.072 0.259 
Wikipedia 
(http://www.wikipedia.org/) 
Rugby club in the area 0.132 0.339 
Hooliganism 0.017 0.128 
New stadium to come 0.300 0.458 UCPF (http://www.ucpf.fr/) 
Home promotion effect 0.150 0.357 
Wikipedia 
Away promotion effect 0.150 0.357 
2008-2009 0.334 0.472 
LFP 
2009-2010 0.331 0.471 
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2010-2011 0.335 0.472 
Competitive balance 1.038 0.068 Football Data 
(http://www.football-data.co.uk/) 
Winning the league / next 
match 
0.115 0.318 
LFP and Wikipedia 
 
Champions League / next 
match 
0.096 0.295 
Champions League 
qualifying round / next 
match 
0.072 0.259 
Europa League / next match 0.032 0.175 
Europa League qualifying 
round / next match 
0.011 0.102 
Potential Europa League / 
next match 
0.012 0.110 
Potential Europa League 
qualifying round / next 
match 
0.028 0.166 
Double prize / next match 0.107 0.309 
Relegation / next match 0.201 0.401 
Winning the league / next 2 
matches 
0.218 0.413 
Champions League / next 2 
matches 
0.102 0.303 
Champions League 
qualifying round / next 2 
matches 
0.033 0.180 
Europa League / next 2 
matches 
0.045 0.207 
Europa League qualifying 0.010 0.100 
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round / next 2 matches 
Potential Europa League / 
next 2 matches 
0.007 0.084 
Potential Europa League 
qualifying round / next 2 
matches 
0.014 0.118 
Double prize / next 2 
matches 
0.130 0.337 
Relegation / next 2 matches 0.270 0.444 
Winning the league / next 3 
matches 
0.276 0.447 
Champions League / next 3 
matches 
0.074 0.262 
Champions League 
qualifying round / next 3 
matches 
0.033 0.180 
Europa League / next 3 
matches 
0.033 0.180 
Europa League qualifying 
round / next 3 matches 
0.010 0.100 
Potential Europa League / 
next 3 matches 
0.008 0.089 
Potential Europa League 
qualifying round / next 3 
matches 
0.014 0.118 
Double prize / next 3 
matches 
0.146 0.353 
Relegation / next 3 matches 0.304 0.460 
Top prizes / next 4th match 0.011 0.106 
Relegation / next 4th match 0.022 0.147 
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Table 4. Estimates of the attendance equation. 
 
Next match Next 2 matches 
Next 3 matches + top prizes 
and relegation for the next 
4th match 
Coef. St. err. Sig. Coef. St. err. Sig. Coef. St. err. Sig. 
Population 0.221 0.003 *** 0.220 0.009 *** 0.222 0.009 *** 
Income -1.976 0.096 *** -1.986 0.097 *** -2.023 0.096 *** 
Unemployment 2.204 0.950 ** 2.310 0.954 ** 2.155 0.949 ** 
Young people 1.344 0.280 *** 1.287 0.280 *** 1.204 0.283 *** 
Budget home 
team 
0.719 0.022 *** 0.725 0.022 *** 0.730 0.022 *** 
Budget away 
team 
0.192 0.016 *** 0.188 0.016 *** 0.186 0.016 *** 
Standing home 
team 
-0.007 0.002 *** -0.007 0.002 *** -0.008 0.002 *** 
Standing away 
team 
-0.003 -0.001 **1 -0.003 -0.001 **1 -0.003 -0.001 ** 
Goals home 
team at home 
-0.003 0.013  -0.004 0.013  -0.003 0.013  
Game week -0.009 0.003 *** -0.012 0.003 *** -0.013 0.003 *** 
(Game week)² 0.0003 0.0001 *** 0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.0004 0.0001 *** 
On weekdays -0.038 0.027  -0.046 0.028 *3 -0.045 0.027 *3 
Saturday 7pm -0.001 0.025  -0.008 0.025  -0.005 0.025  
Saturday 9pm 0.001 0.029  -0.003 0.030  0.001 0.029  
Sunday 5pm -0.034 0.026  -0.041 0.026  -0.037 0.026  
Sunday 9pm ref. 
Derby 0.134 0.024 *** 0.133 0.025 *** 0.130 0.024 *** 
Rugby -0.023 0.035  -0.016 0.035  -0.011 0.035  
Hooliganism -0.187 0.038 *** -0.207 0.038 *** -0.217 0.038 *** 
New stadium to -0.443 0.017 *** -0.442 0.017 *** -0.442 0.017 *** 
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come 
Home promotion 
effect 
0.217 0.020 *** 0.223 0.021 *** 0.222 0.020 *** 
Away promotion 
effect 
0.075 0.018 *** 0.066 0.018 *** 0.067 0.018 *** 
2008-2009    ref.      
2009-2010 -0.173 0.017 *** -0.173 0.018 *** -0.168 0.019 *** 
2010-2011 -0.218 0.019 *** -0.214 0.019 *** -0.205 0.019 *** 
Competitive 
balance 
-0.041 0.140  -0.065 0.141  -0.030 0.143  
Winning the 
league 
0.152 0.022 *** 0.137 0.026 *** 0.171 0.032 *** 
Champions 
League 
0.095 0.024 *** 0.072 0.027 *** 0.110 0.034 *** 
Champions 
League 
qualifying round 
0.030 0.024  0.070 0.038 * 0.108 0.041 *** 
Europa League -0.003 0.034  0.039 0.030 4 0.095 0.039 **6 
Europa League 
qualifying round 
0.071 0.048 1 0.148 0.040 *** 0.137 0.052 *** 
Potential Europa 
League 
0.084 0.072  0.093 0.057 5 0.075 0.077  
Potential Europa 
League 
qualifying round 
0.133 0.036 *** 0.141 0.055 **6 0.147 0.055 *** 
Double prize 0.083 0.031 ***2 0.076 0.032 **1 0.105 0.036 *** 
Relegation 0.049 0.020 **1 0.050 0.023 **1 0.092 0.030 *** 
Top prizes / next 
4th match 
 -   -  0.039 0.056  
Relegation / next  -   -  0.101 0.055 * 
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4th match 
Constant -4.341 0.554 *** -4.288 0.561 *** -4.292 0.556 *** 
Observations 1135 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
209.3 202.2 202.7 
Sigma 0.194 0.004  0.195 0.004  0.195 0.004  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * means p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01. 
1 Significant at the 1% level when censoring at 90%. 
2 Significant at the 5% level when censoring at 98%. 
3 No significant when censoring at 90% and 98%. 
4 Significant at the 10% level when censoring at 90%. 
5 Significant at the 5% level when censoring at 90%. 
6 Significant at the 1% level when censoring at 90% and 98%. 
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Table 5. Estimates of the attendance equation by distinguishing the next match, the next second match and the 
next third match for each sporting prize. 
 Importance Closeness 
 Coef. St. err. Sig. Coef. St. err. Sig. 
Winning the league / next 
match 
0.229 0.035 *** 0.239 0.035 *** 
Champions League / next 
match 
0.096 0.049 *1 0.179 0.036 *** 
Champions League 
qualifying round / next 
match 
0.104 0.053 *2 0.111 0.034 *** 
Europa League / next match 0.125 0.057 **1 0.078 0.041 *2 
Europa League qualifying 
round / next match 
0.202 0.060 *** 0.138 0.054 *** 
Potential Europa League / 
next match 
-0.006 0.038  0.171 0.077 **1 
Potential Europa League 
qualifying round / next 
match 
0.281 0.075 *** 0.220 0.044 *** 
Double prize / next match 0.151 0.041 *** 0.164 0.040 *** 
Relegation / next match 0.107 0.032 *** 0.112 0.031 *** 
Winning the league / next 
second match 
0.157 0.036 *** 0.182 0.047 *** 
Champions League / next 
second match 
0.115 0.038 *** 0.152 0.051 ***6 
Champions League 
qualifying round / next 
second match 
0.171 0.091 *2 0.090 0.068  
Europa League / next second 
match 
0.085 0.044 *1 0.086 0.044 *5 
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Europa League qualifying 
round / next second match 
0.191 0.032 *** 0.170 0.041 *** 
Potential Europa League / 
next second match 
0.182 0.076 **1 0.144 0.058 **1 
Potential Europa League 
qualifying round / next 
second match 
0.107 0.084  0.063 0.084  
Double prize / next second 
match 
0.093 0.053 *2 0.100 0.052 *5 
Relegation / next second 
match 
0.069 0.036 *3 0.076 0.035 **1 
Winning the league / next 
third match 
0.132 0.038 *** 0.173 0.142  
Champions League / next 
third match 
0.147 0.048 *** 0.090 0.040 **7 
Champions League 
qualifying round / next third 
match 
0.094 0.053 *2 0.036 0.070  
Europa League / next third 
match 
0.136 0.094  0.166 0.085 *5 
Europa League qualifying 
round / next third match 
-0.007 0.051  -0.005 0.052  
Potential Europa League / 
next third match 
-0.067 0.132  -0.205 0.077 ***8 
Potential Europa League 
qualifying round / next third 
match 
0.030 0.065  0.029 0.065  
Double prize / next third 
match 
0.065 0.056 4 0.068 0.056 4 
Relegation / next third match 0.096 0.045 ** 0.099 0.054 *5 
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Top prizes / next fourth 
match 
0.033 0.056  0.035 0.056  
Relegation / next fourth 
match 
0.096 0.055 * 0.097 0.054 * 
Constant -4.312 0.558 *** -4.415 0.555 *** 
Observations 1135 
Log pseudolikelihood 214.9 219.1 
Sigma 0.193 0.004  0.192 0.004  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * means p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 and *** p < 0.01. 
1 Significant at the 1% level when censoring at 90%. 
2 Significant at the 5% level when censoring at 90%. 
3 Significant at the 1% level when censoring at 90% and at the 5% level when censoring at 98%. 
4 Significant at the 10% level when censoring at 90%. 
5 Significant at the 5% level when censoring at 90% and 98%. 
6 Significant at the 5% level when censoring at 98%. 
7 Significant at the 10% level when censoring at 90% and at the 1% level when censoring at 98%. 
8 No significant when censoring at 90%. 
 
